Unmasking the Doctored Image of Foreign Aid: A Mirror Model by Gentle-Genitty, Carolyn
 1 
Unmasking the Doctored Image of Foreign Aid: A Mirror Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Information: 
 
Carolyn Gentle-Genitty 
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis 
Email: cgentleg@iupui.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the author's manuscript of the article published in final edited form as: 
 
Gentle-Genitty, C. S. (2006). Unmasking the Doctored Image of Foreign Aid: A Mirror Model. 
Social Development Issues, 28(3), 16–29. 
 2 
Running Head: FOREIGN AID: SOCIAL WELFARE DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES. 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign aid: A doctored image of impact on social welfare development in developing countries 
Inter-University Consortium for International Social Development 
Doctoral Student - Carolyn Gentle- Genitty 
Indiana University- Purdue University Indianapolis School of Social Work 
 3 
  
 
Brief Abstract:  
Foreign aid is primarily a wealth transfer mechanism from rich, developed countries to poor, 
developing countries.  Throughout the world, developing countries have received billions in aid 
to assist in their social welfare development and rise from poverty.  Yet, there are still many in 
poverty.  This paper examines the impact, if any, on social welfare development in the recipient 
countries because of foreign aid from donor countries.   
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Foreign aid: A doctored image of impact on social welfare development in developing countries 
 
As of 2003, many industrialized and developed nations sent out more that $50 billion a 
year to developing countries in the form of in-kind items, grants, low-interest loans, personnel, 
and technical assistance under the guise of foreign aid (Perez, 2003).  Over the past 50 years the 
United States alone has spent over some $750 billion, and in some records trillions of dollars on 
foreign aid (Pearson, 2004).    This assistance is funneled to third world nations and developing 
countries largely to assist in poverty alleviation and/or social welfare development.  Thomas 
(1999) points out that the need for foreign aid in third world countries is great: 
These third world states house eighty-five percent of the global population, 
including the overwhelming majority of the world’s poor, and produce only 20 
percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  They lack general 
progress in national development.  Three billion people in these countries lack 
basic sanitation; one and half billion lack clean water; a billion or more are 
without adequate food, housing, [or] healthcare; and twenty percent of children do 
not learn to read and write.  While acknowledging differentiation within this 
inclusive third world grouping in broad terms, these states remain economically 
weak, politically powerless and socially marginalized.  (p. 227) 
Despite 30 years of studies, little is known about the impact or effectiveness of foreign aid on 
social welfare development (Hansen & Tarp, 1999).  Aid has decreased sharply because many 
believe that it does not work to alleviate the factors it was meant too; some calling it ‘aid fatigue’ 
(Lensik & White, 1999).  Much of the analysis in the literature on foreign aid has focused on the 
economics of aid (Tang 1996) across countries thereby only producing a doctored image of 
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impact.  There is a blatant assumption that production sectors in various countries over time will 
be similar (Lensik & White, 1999).  For example, the majority of the literature reviewed (Alba, 
2004; Bauer, 2000; Blanchette, 2003; Brumm, 2003; Dollar & Pritchett, 1998; Hansen & Tarp, 
1999; Lensink & White, 1999; McGillivary & Morrissey, 2000; Perez, 2003) focuses on 
relationships of aid to economic growth, trade, and basic nutritional provisions through 
agricultural policies across countries.  These factors, however, fail to show a direct link between 
foreign aid and positive social welfare development (Ovaska, 2003).  In essence, direct receipt of 
aid, by recipient countries are often mistaken for increases in social development by donor 
countries (Dollar, 2003).  
A few studies in particular (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, & Verschoor, 2003; Lupien, 
2002; Tang, 1996) have shown links to areas of poverty reduction as an indication of positive 
social welfare development in developing countries.  For example, the studies use the human 
development index (HDI) and infant mortality rates as key indicators of social welfare 
(Gomanee, et al., 2003) to help show impact on development from aid.  This is clearly a step 
forward in unmasking and accounting for foreign aid’s true impact on social welfare 
development (Lensik & White, 1999); but it is likely that no matter the variables studied, there 
will be significance despite the relationship being commonsensical (Lensik & White, 1999).  
There should be clear and noticeable impacts on social welfare development from foreign aid, 
especially if one considers the mass amount of resources shared, distributed, and acquired by 
developing countries for this purpose.  Current insight and documentation is insufficient in 
determining how aid works, and to what extent the impact of foreign aid has on social welfare 
development in third world countries (Lensik & White, 1999; Pearson, 2004).  Hence greater 
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efforts must be expended to pay attention to what is present, as well as what is absent as aid is 
fungible (Lensik & White, 1999).   
This paper proposes to examine foreign aid and the impact it has had on developing 
countries through the evaluation of social welfare development via government public 
expenditures in recipient countries.  Five relevant areas to be explored for this examination 
includes: 1) what is foreign aid; 2) overview of third world/developing countries; 3) impact of 
foreign aid on developing countries via public expenditures, 4) understanding the doctored image 
through a power lens and public expenditures and 5) implications for social work and future 
research.  Please note that due to the interchangeable use of developing countries and third world 
nations in the literature the names are used in the same manner in this paper to account for the 
same population.  
 
FOREIGN AID 
 
To understand how aid may affect the development of third world countries, we need to 
consider the context.  Since 1958, through efforts of the World council of Churches and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donor nations have been 
asked to contribute to the development of third world nations by giving aid to a proposed target 
of 0.7 percent (Adelman, 2003).  Since then, only Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and the 
Netherlands have gotten close to the target even though the OECD has realized that meeting the 
target has no real indicator of quality or impact (Adelman, 2003).  The term foreign aid has a 
broad definition and was initially geared toward various aspects of influence of economic and/or 
social reforms (Gomanee, et al., 2003).  In addition to this, some authors have defined its 
purpose as a way to promote increased economic growth through “a mixture of ideas and money 
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customized to meet the local conditions of recipient countries” (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998); and as 
“welfare for governments – welfare on a global scale; government-to-government subsidies 
funded through taxes and constitute wealth transfer between governments” (Blanchette, 2003, 1-
2).  Recently foreign aid has changed from pure government-to-government support to a 
diversity of actors and complex partnerships including support from shipment of vaccines, 
remittances, scholarships and even help from religious organizations.  Foreign aid also 
constitutes help to other countries in the form of technical support, trade loans, emergency, 
disaster relief, and direct grants among others (Adelman, 2003).  Foreign aid, especially in large 
amounts, has shown to support government spending with the intent of reducing poverty, or at 
least improving the welfare and living conditions of the poor (Gomanee et al., 2003); any effort 
beyond this to buy influence is often trumped (Pearson, 2004). 
The variation in scope and definitions of aid according to Santiso (2001) has itself caused 
confusion.  It has allowed for unclear boundaries in examining aid and the inability to identify 
specifically how aid impacts social welfare development.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
definition offered by Dollar and Pritchett, (1998) is most relevant “a mixture of ideas and money 
customized to meet the local conditions of recipient countries”.  For a better understanding of 
foreign aid a quick synopsis of some of the various viewpoints of the giver (first world states, 
donor countries) and the receiver (third world or developing countries) is necessary. 
View of foreign aid by developing countries 
Coincidentally as there are varying definitions of foreign aid, there are varying views of 
what aid is expected to do once it reaches the recipient countries (Englehart, 2004). Thomas 
(1999) believed “What is at stake is the relationship between market, state and society” (p.237).  
For instance some aid show an ethical responsibility to decrease poverty, and foster goodwill 
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while others seek to advance economic interest and stability while creating foreign markets for 
U.S. goods (Englehart, 2004).  The donor and recipient needs vary (Lensik & White, 1999); for 
each there are pros and cons in the representation of views.  Aid began not as a mere handout for 
developing countries, particularly Africa and Latin and Central America, but as a possibility for 
the reduction of poverty and promotion of increased economic growth (Gomanee, et al, 2003).  
Negative views by developing countries largely result from defining foreign aid as a pre-made 
fix-it-all formula that negatively impact social welfare development, disrupt economies and 
foster dependency (Arimah, 2004).  This limits economic markets and the capacity of developing 
countries to develop and pursue their own objectives (Weiss, 1999).  In fact,  as of the late 1990s 
foreign aid (or aid inflows) accounted for a great part of the revenue base for public expenditure, 
touting signs of dependency, for most developing countries (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000) 
(See Table 1).  
With increased attention to the needs of the country, many developing nations in the 
1950s began to shift their focus to social welfare programs (Tang, 1996) and sought increases in 
foreign aid.  Foreign aid was further seen as a way to bring about a better quality of life by 
decreasing extreme poverty, reducing illiteracy rates, infant mortality rates, and disparity 
between genders (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998).  Developing countries wanted to increase their 
economic growth, infrastructure, production, and savings ability while ultimately changing the 
daily reality of their citizens (Thomas, 1999); unfortunately these views were not shared by 
donor countries. 
View of foreign aid by donor countries 
Supplying aid on the part of the donor, although sometimes born of altruistic motivations 
is primarily rooted in self-interest (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998).  This interest is based on the hope 
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that future security, albeit political and/or economic, will prosper from allegiance to donor 
countries by recipient countries because of receiving aid (Francis, 2003).  Quite noteworthy is 
that this self interest spans the protection of borders against negative social ills; in spite of the 
fact that social ills are not country-specific and do not respect borders.  Hence, foreign aid also 
served as bargaining chips to protect donor countries and not necessarily to aid developing 
countries in addressing social welfare, and development needs (Perez, 2003).   Pearson (2004) 
adds that as a defense tactic and as a form of foreign aid, the United States in the 1960s 
established government-to-government subsidies.  This type of tactic was used, to pre-empt 
development in the Soviet Union and buy influence in non-Communist developing countries 
under the guise of combating poverty.  Some donor countries nonetheless, have an ethical 
interest in poverty reduction, despite self-interest in the security of foreign markets (Englehart, 
2004).  As we better understand foreign aid there is a need to grasp an understanding of the 
recipient countries.   
 
OVERVIEW OF THIRD WORLD/DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Varied names have been given to developing countries.  Some authors use third world 
states, developing nations and/or countries and recipient countries, while others use third world 
countries.  For the purposes of this paper, these concepts are used interchangeably. 
A humanistic view to the third world, using a definition coined by Thomas (1999 
identifies these countries as  
those human beings for whom poverty is the norm, for whom vulnerability and 
risk are defining features of their daily existence, wherever they are located 
territorially.  Their search is for security, fulfillment of basic material needs; the 
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achievement of human dignity, which includes personal autonomy, control over 
one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community (p.229).   
Developing countries are seen as poor, marginal populations, in need of help and rescuing (Tang, 
1996).  They account for 20% of the production of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
world and today as many as 70 developing countries are still in severe poverty, loosing the fight 
despite receiving aid (Pearson, 2004).   They have huge economic, savings and foreign exchange 
gaps (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998).  The governments’ in-ability to solve recurrent economic 
problems creates escalating welfare and social welfare development costs (Tang, 1996).  De Soto 
(2000) adds that developing countries simply do not have the capacity to turn their belongings 
into usable economic assets that can contribute to get them out of poverty.  For instance, the 
citizenry have ‘houses but not titles,’ ‘crops but not deeds,’ ‘businesses but not statues of 
incorporation’; without this, they cannot produce sufficient capital (De Soto, 2000). 
In addition, these countries account for populations where over two billion live on less 
than 1-2 US dollars a day and are home to the majority of the world’s poor.  Population growth 
in these regions reinforces poverty (Lupien, 2002).  With limited job creation markets, a low-
skilled labor force, shifts in household structure (the rise of one-parent families) and 
demographics, the result is an increase of those in severe poverty (Weiss, 1999).  Poverty is a 
reality of the developing societies in which economic growth is rarely seen and if so, only in 
marginal percentages (Dollar, 2003).  The result is that many countries began to seek foreign aid 
to help break this cycle of poverty (Bauer, 2000).   
In addition there is constant political instability in developing countries compensated by 
foreign aid (Lensik & White, 1999).  This instability is economic in nature though it guises as 
political.  For example, in violence ridden and changing government environments it is more 
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likely that political instability would negatively influence aid effectiveness and may never 
contribute to growth (Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2002).   
IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Relevant and comparable research findings are limited (Mosse, 2004).  This is due 
largely to the fact that foreign aid’s relationships to social values, cultural factors, historical 
events, conflicts, and its ability to continuously adapt to the realities of the world has been 
overlooked in assessment (Lapshina, 2004).  Because the outcomes measured have varied from 
researcher to researcher, based on their hypotheses and operationalization of foreign aid and 
impact, both foreign aid and global public goods have been shown to impact social welfare 
development in developing countries (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998).  The result is that the impact of 
foreign aid could increase or decrease based on what variables are measured to show impact.  
Examining global public goods such as policies for poverty reduction may increase results on 
social welfare impact.  On the other hand if structural characteristics and the country’s 
vulnerability to climatic and external shocks such as hurricane and other disasters are not 
considered there could be a sharp decline in measurement of social welfare development 
(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001).  This is what fuels the view of those who argue that foreign aid 
has become associated with fraud, waste, and abuse (Thornton, 2002).  Lack of standardized 
measurements limits ability to generalize findings on aid.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid positively impact social welfare 
development in recipient countries, particularly if there are fiscal measures and policies that 
support the poor.  Such findings however, place power in the hands of politicians and corruption is 
welcomed, not punished (Rogoff, 2004). Underground market economies are then forced (Bauer, 
2000).  Sadly helping recipient countries to clean up their act or policies before distributing, is not 
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seen by donor countries as their responsibility but that of the governments of developing nations 
(Johnson, 2004).  This is the reason, hypothetically, why aid has not worked to the magnitude it 
can (Rogoff, 2004).   
Despite increasing foreign aid, developing countries remain vulnerable (Weiss, 1999).   
Not withstanding the foreign aid that is given, donors take it all back in protectionist trade 
policies.  For instance, the “value of annual agricultural subsidies in rich nations is more than 
three times the yearly aid flow to poor countries, causing heavy losses to producers in the 
developing world” (Perez, 2003, p.63)  (See Figure 1).  Years of foreign assistance have not 
worked for some countries such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) (Blanchette, 
2003).   Aid results continue to be disappointing (Ovaska, 2003).  For instance Blanchette (2003) 
shares that it is the political instability of developing nations that has stunted growth from 
foreign aid because:  
Funds, clothing, food, etc. are not given directly to the poor; rather they are 
funneled through the recipient governments.  Any ‘aid’ that is subsequently 
passed down to the poor of developing countries is secondary and incidental.  The 
recipient country’s government decides where and how much money actually 
reaches its citizens.  Because corruption runs rampant through much of the 
developing world, vast sums of aid are embezzled or consumed by government 
employees (p 3). 
Some developing countries’ own political powerlessness, economic poverty, and social 
marginalization (Thomas, 1999) gets in the way of effectively meeting the objectives of social 
welfare development vis-à-vis foreign aid.  When government self-accountability fails that is 
when the social welfare in developing countries is negatively affected (Schacter, 2001).  The 
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World Bank reports that corruption is a major factor why foreign aid has not contributed to 
adequate amounts of impact on social welfare development (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998).  Other 
than corruption, aid has been misused for many other reasons.  For instance in North Korea 
foreign aid was used to develop lethal weapons, leaving their citizens in need of food relief to 
starve.  The Zimbabwean dictator similarly used the aid received as ‘political weapons,’ where 
food was used to reward allies and starve enemies (Pearson, 2004).    
However, in using Dollar and Pritchett, 1998 definition of foreign aid, “a mixture of ideas 
and money customized to meet the local conditions of recipient countries” as the basis to 
measure impact on social welfare development, much has been achieved.   Aggregate savings 
and investment have increased in developing countries, showing positive relationships with 
growth (Hansen & Tarp, 1999).  Foreign aid for assistance in the health care and systematic 
needs of developing countries, national peace, and conflict resolution, and educational literacy 
needs has significantly contributed to social welfare development (Guillaumont, 2004).  Aid 
inflows to governments have freed up governmental resources allowing governments to invest in 
the social welfare of its people.  This is evidence of foreign aid improving social welfare 
development in developing countries (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998; Lensink & White, 1999).   
In fact billions of dollars have already been distributed in the history of foreign aid by 
rich countries, particularly the G71 (Perez, 2003).  Lupien (2002) points to evidence that   
The number of literate adults has tripled, from approximately 1 billion in 1960 to 
more than 2.7 billion today, and the proportion of children out of primary school 
has fallen from more than half to less than one-quarter. The share of rural families 
without access to a safe water supply has fallen from nine-tenths to about one-
                                                 
1 G7 countries: These are the richest countries identified by Perez (2003) that contribute to the aid inflows in 
developing countries.  These include Canada, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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quarter, and 80% of people in developing countries now have access to health 
services (Lupien, 2002, p. 3). 
In addition countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Tunisia, Thailand, China, Chile, and Cuba, have 
seen considerable progress because of foreign aid (Lupien, 2002).  The monies spent on Africa’s 
human development in the areas of education, expenditure on health, good governance, 
economic growth, and external debt have brought noticeable improvement to social welfare 
development (Arimah, 2004).  In their study of pro-poor public expenditures (PPE) with 39 
countries from 1980 to 1998, Gomanee and colleagues (2003) found that PPE results increased 
welfare development.  For instance, the developing countries’ sanitation, education, and even 
health-based sectors on the evaluation of the Human Development Indices and Infant Mortality 
Rates showed great development (Gomanee et al., 2003).  South (2004) also found that aid 
greatly influenced the rebirth of civil societies and reforms in developing countries. Because of 
direct foreign aid, hundreds of millions of Asia’s citizens are much better off today and out of 
poverty (Brown, 2003).  Research findings suggest that in Bolivia, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uganda, technical cooperation represented huge portions of social welfare capacity development 
(Hilderbrand, 2002).  Hilderbrand’s research in developing countries demonstrated that foreign 
aid has had tremendous impact on these societies and their people. This alarming impact has 
been due to … 
Early aid support for scholarships and universities helped to create a base of well-
educated professionals for Uganda, many of whom form the core staff of 
government ministries.  In Kyrgyz, technical cooperation played a substantial role 
much more recently in helping develop new institutions for a market economy 
and a democratic government, and in training and acculturating the group of 
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professionals needed to run those institutions.  Reform programs in Bolivia, 
including reforms essential to strengthening national capacity, including 
education reform and popular participation, were supported largely by technical 
cooperation.  The blossoming of civil society and NGOs in the Philippines, while 
certainly not brought about by the donor, was supported by their encouragement 
of participatory process and institutions and their openness to work with NGOs.  
These, among many other contributions, should not be overlooked even when 
casting a critical eye on technical cooperation’s overall performance (p. 5). 
Recommendations 
Despite the successes, Hansen and Tarp (1999) caution that the instruments used must be 
able to adequately measure the impact on social welfare development in light of the variability in 
country circumstances. There has been no standardized instrument for effectively measure 
foreign aid’s impact (Hansen & Tarp, 1999).   In fact, this is what interferes with its ability to be 
measured and why the full gamut of the impact of social welfare development in developing 
countries has not been clearly observed.  Measurement of impact has grown slowly (Dollar, 
2003).   Development is not for unwillingness to help impoverished nations for undoubtedly 
efforts have been employed to stabilize economic markets (Brueggemann, 2002).  
For instance, (refer back to Table 1), there is evidence provided by Perez (2003) that 
support has been given to trade, investment, and migration, peacekeeping and even 
environmental development.  However, this reference may only show that aid has helped in these 
particular areas in developing countries but not that they impacted positively on social welfare 
development (Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2002).  Measuring foreign aid’s ability to impact social 
welfare development in developing countries has three main factors.  These include, examining 
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the effect of foreign aid on policy, the potential impact of external shocks, and the relationship 
between aid effectiveness, policy, and political instability over a long term.  If these variables are 
assumed to have no direct effect there are flaws in analysis (Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2002).   
 
THE DOCTORED IMAGE THROUGH A POWER LENS 
 
This section examines the role of measurement, and the lack of appropriate 
measurements in regards to foreign aid has impacted social welfare development.  The landmark 
study by Dollar & Pritchett, 1998 “Assessing aid: what works, what doesn’t and why?” presents 
respectable findings but has been criticized (Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2002; Guillaumont & 
Chauvet, 2001).  Many of the difficulties in the cornerstone research on assessing aid by Dollar 
& Pritchett (1998) had to do with their understanding of aid assessment using their frame of 
reference.  They reported that there were no effects to recipient countries in regards to external 
shocks not acknowledging that this can single handedly hamper development tremendously 
(Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2002).  Since it is evident that both foreign aid, external shocks i.e. 
natural disaster, and the relationship between policy, and political instability over a long term 
interferes with foreign aid’s ability to impact positively on social welfare development.  In 
addition to external shocks, the way in which power functions are exercised, albeit by the donor 
or the recipients of foreign aid must be examined (Amoore & Langley, 2004).  The model of 
explanation presented explores some of the power relations that affect impact of social welfare 
development.  
MIRROR MODEL  
The mirror model (See Appendix 1), is explanatory in nature and looks at the reflective 
image that recipient and donor countries ultimately expect when giving and receiving aid.  Often 
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viewed as charity by first world states in theory, give to poor countries hoping to increase and 
speed up economic and humanitarian needs and development (Francis, 2003).  In essence the 
model suggests that these countries want to see images of themselves reflected in the other.  The 
model touts at the “if … then” what of explanatory reasoning (Breuning, 2003).  If foreign aid is 
given for one reason, then where does the responsibility to affect change occur in the underlying 
social welfare development needs of the recipient countries? It is a well researched fact that many 
collaborative activities, conducted with donors and their selfish interests (Lensik & White, 1999; 
Hansen & Tarp, 1999) drive interactions with recipient countries.  However, even selfish interests 
for each country seem to negate the impact of social welfare development and the gain is not the 
assumed end.  This concept is idealized by the model. (See Figure 3 for pictorial view of model).   
First world  states look at third world states and see what they can gain but also what 
dependency can be fostered to ensure continued world dominance (Francis, 2003, Pearson, 2004; 
Hoefer, 1996). The more countries stay in poverty the more they receive funding.  It is the way 
power and control is maintained (Pearson, 2004; Van der Hoeven, 2000).  Socially, donor 
countries do not want to see severe signs of poverty that may one day transcend borders and be 
present in their countries (Bauer, 2000).   Third world states on the other hand, see the first world 
and their successes and want to mirror that same success in their societies, at whatever cost.  There 
is a continued attempt to copy capitalism and its policies and patterns (Bauer, 2000).  Thus policies 
are welcomed from capitalist societies. As a result, each state (first and third world) looks at the 
mirror image of themselves and exert influence, power and control to secure a place on the 
economic market platform (Rogoff, 2004).  In fact Pearson (2004) stated quite vividly that “once 
seen as charity for the starving, foreign aid has become a huge politically motivated bureaucracy 
that has little to do with poverty, but instead attempts to secure votes or otherwise buy influence” 
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(p. 1). For example, economically developed nations, especially the United States, rely heavily on 
foreigners and to remain in control and share a large part of the world economic markets (Peterson, 
2004a). This adds to the political power of the rich and especially US’s ability to wield power as 
global hegemon (Derouen Jr. & HEO, 2004). The distribution of foreign aid continues to keep 
these realities at bay, and not essentially cure them or alleviate them (Rogoff, 2004)  If aid were 
distributed, for instance by the United States at the levels that they are to give stated by the United 
Nations (0.7 % of national GDP) many developing countries would be well off (Perez, 2003).  
There would be more countries coming out of poverty daily, an obvious fear for the wealthy and 
rich donor countries (Rogoff, 2004).  However, great energies have gone into developing effective 
policy models but not in evaluating their practical effectiveness (Mosse, 2004). 
Granted empirical models have been used in assessing foreign aid’s impact on social 
welfare development (Brumm, 2003).  However a standard methodology has been overlooked to 
keep all researchers focused on the proper tasks and activities required when studying this 
phenomenon (Paper, Rodger, & Pendharker, 2000).  The reality is that many of the models are 
‘how to models’ and not ‘why’ models.  This type of model according to Paper and colleagues 
(2000) incorporates the fundamental principle of a transformation methodology, where social 
development change results can shape the implementation and articulation of further 
development goals through tactical and effective decision making. 
To understand the process better the model identifies that there are six main activities that 
take place in mirroring an image of self when distributing aid.  These activities include bargaining 
(including political factors, colonial status), assessment & reassessment, mutual benefits 
established, exchange, situational re-analysis and re-bargaining and dependency (See Table 2 and 
direction of process in Figure 2).   
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Bargaining 
In the initial activity, bargaining, the donor countries review their needed relationships and 
policies and assess the recipient country potential (Peterson, 2004b).  On the other hand the 
recipient country evaluates the patterns of the donor and looks for a window of opportunity for 
them to gain assistance, as they see no other alternative to financing (Weiss, 1999).  Sometimes the 
political factors may be simply to buy votes from developing countries in the UN voting process.  
On the other hand if a country was formerly of colonial status they may get twice as much aid 
especially if they are of non-democratic status by their former colonizers (Francis, 2003).   
Assessment & Reassessment  
 The second activity is that of assessment and reassessment, where the donor and the 
prospective recipient country acknowledge the need for aid makes a request for aid. Recognizing 
that aid is dispersed based on relative need from an very humanistic perspective and  “the needier 
the country the more aid is expected to be received” (Feeny & McGillivray, 2004, p.101).  This 
activity allows for the patterns of giving to be clear across developing nations (Francis, 2003). 
Mutual benefits established 
 The third activity where mutual benefits are established follows the examination for mutual 
power-political economic status and position by the donor countries.  This is because, based on 
several studies, the needs of recipient countries are not always primary influential factors in aid 
allocation (Feeny & McGillivray, 2004).  The authors further explain that with support from 
similar studies by Maizels & Nissanke (1984) aid allocations are made primarily to support 
perceived foreign economic, political and security interests (Feeny & McGillivray, 2004, p.101).  
At this time the prospective recipient countries simply wait as their policies and willingness to 
comply are evaluated by donor countries.  
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Exchange 
The fourth activity is exchange where the donor country reassesses the request for aid by 
prospective recipient country.  However, during this reassessment, the prospective recipient 
country engages in a type of bargaining to ascertain what to do with the aid, theoretically.  For 
instance developing countries may consider their need to access their products to markets in the 
first world states or developed nations and thus may bargain on this point (Van der Hoeven, 2000).  
Thereafter aid may be disbursed and progress, if any is tracked. 
Situational reanalysis and re-bargaining 
 Progress of aid impact is reported to the donor country and re-bargaining may take place 
for more aid, based on need or incompletion of project or even because of dependency for 
continuing to enhance social welfare development. Clearly this is a difficult aspect due to the 
fungibility of aid creating a ‘fiscal illusion’ (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000).  Lensik and White 
(1999) points out that the fungibility of aid is not necessarily a question of corruption but that aid 
given to a project may be used to help free up resources for governments in the same area if 
monies were already allocated.  Hence in reporting success, the project may have been achieved 
but not always with the resources from the donor (Lensik & White, 1999). 
Dependency 
Thereafter the recipient country fosters a sort of dependency continuously requiring aid to 
carry out the work (Weiss, 1999).  Due to a commitment to either political motivations or 
humanitarian needs the donor country continues to disburse aid (Lensik & White, 1999).  This 
happens especially of the measures for aid successes is not transparent, not communicated to the 
recipient country departments and the recipients do not have effective means of monitoring the 
expenditures and budgetary processes” (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000, p.7) If not the process 
 21 
Weiss (1999) cautions is the result of a globalization where recipient countries loose its capacity to 
control and protect its social, and economic well-being of its members.  The result is diminished 
power.   
Foundations of the model  
The model embraces many theoretical aspects.  However, the reason for choosing the 
theories relies on an understanding of how change occurs researched by Edwards and Sen 
(2000).  The researchers write that  
From the perspective of change, all social systems rest on three bases: a set of 
principles that form an axiomatic basis of ethics and values; a set of processes – 
the functioning mechanisms and institutions that under grid the system and the 
subjective states that constitute our inner being – our personal feelings and 
intuitions in the deepest sense.  The first of these bases of change describes how 
we understand and rationalize the workings of the social order, while the third 
describes how we understand ourselves.  Some of this understanding revolves 
around our own place in the social order, but it also concerns the deeper questions 
we ask ourselves about the meaning of human existence and the nature of reality 
(p. 606). 
Based on this model of understanding the mirror explanatory model is grounded 
essentially in structural functionalist ( belief that there is already an assumed order based on 
current position on the world market), systems theory (within this structure there are various 
systems, subsystems that must work together and transcend border boundaries systems to operate 
and exist in the suprasystem), and conflict theory as there is mass competition for very scare 
resources conceptually drive the collaboration.  The model through these theories explains the 
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political and economical dimensions of foreign aid and why impact has been minimally observed 
in developing nations.   
Advantages of the model 
The model is linear and simplistic and is not laden with economic matrices.  It allows 
both developing countries and donor countries to see pictorial interactions.  The strength of the 
model is in its concept.  Its foundation explains that despite the country of origin, albeit donor or 
recipient, we want to see a reflection that is an image of ourselves.  This basic concept explains 
why, in every third world country, that one may visit, peddlers flock the street selling everything 
and anything that they have created, built or grown, mimicking a capitalist society (De Soto, 
2000).  Sadly the model showcases a weakness of countries to help themselves.  The result is that 
developing countries want to be like donor countries and donor countries want to ensure that 
they keep that reality, as it allows them to see themselves in developing nations. 
Limitations of the model 
Yes, the model explains many of the power relations and position of the two world states 
but lacks adequate explanation to maintain collaboration once goals have been achieved.  It does 
not allow for links and variations against the model.  For instance if a country simply disburses 
aid to where it was intended to go without diversion or corruption, the model does not take in 
account this strengths perspective and does not reward the country but simply identifies it as 
abnormal or an outlier.  The model also assumes perfect progression through the collaboration 
stages.  The assumption is that each donor-recipient relation progresses smoothly through the 
group process from norming, storming, forming, and brainstorming, performing stages etc. 
(Brueggemann, 2002) when in fact this may not be the case.  Lastly the model is unique, not 
tested and only explains the variation as why aid has only worked minimally and cannot be 
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generalized to all forms of foreign aid such as emergency relief, hurricane and disaster relief and 
so forth as data is limited. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Foreign aid clearly helps governments free up resources to invest in the welfare of the 
poor (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000).  To ensure investment in the poor, clear tasks and 
responsibilities proportionately, are never allocated to specific entities.  Optimizing that the 
largest share of resources are distributed to the poor require the help of various government, 
national and regional entities including social workers at all those levels.  Social workers 
specifically at the mezzo and macro levels can enable policies that foster growth, allow the flow 
of resources to the poor, and help officials stay clean of corruption.  Gomanee and colleagues 
(2003) suggest that this type of work by social workers and similar entities enhance the growth 
of human welfare impacts and accounts for a fair impact on alleviating poverty.  This fair impact 
cannot come to fruition without advocacy, effective political leadership and will; as the role of 
the social worker in policy advocacy, social policy development and education, and monitoring 
and evaluation becomes clearer (Mallaby, 2004).  Social workers are the common thread in all 
these sectors and there are few involved at the policy level throughout the world and even fewer 
in developing nations (Brueggemann, 2002).  With a common cause, collaboration and a will to 
champion the voiceless, social workers can create the bridge to ensure impact on the social 
welfare development of people and their countries (Edwards & Sen, 2000).  
The voices of social workers cannot come alive until they choose to speak up and share 
their well-reasoned opinions formed by their daily interactions from human interaction 
(Goldstein, 2000) in developing countries.  Until this is done social workers will continue to be 
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viewed as agents of social control rather than agents of change.  They must realized that 
particularly in developing countries ‘information is power’ and thus education is a key tool of 
empower and sharing power. 
FUTURE RESEARCH  
Power relations because of economic market and impact on trade got more attention, as 
outlined in the model, than social welfare development in the distribution of aid.  Aid can serve 
to meet many of the needs of developing countries but is not to be a catch-all cure of every 
ailment.  Because an elite ruling class often concentrates power, there are huge disparities that 
force a distortion of social welfare in favor of the elite, limiting social welfare spending and 
negatively impacting social welfare development (Tang, 1996).  In fact expecting foreign aid to 
address all social welfare development needs of a developing country can be fatal.  Failing to 
impact all, may fail to impact any, thus skewing results to where aid is withdrawn, or redirected 
to other countries who demonstrate success with monies allocated (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998; 
Lensink & White, 1999).  Countries have hurt themselves by becoming extremely dependent 
upon foreign capital to the point of local initiatives not even being noticeable (Brueggemann, 
2002) 
According to Englehart (2004) a clean-up of foreign aid giving and corruption in 
developing countries can bring great improvements in arenas of social welfare.  The revision of 
aid giving can strengthen the need for aid and increase its effectiveness.  This will eventually 
foster selectivity for aid rewarding good policy governments and withdrawing aid for not 
keeping promises (Johnson, 2004).  There is no other way that foreign aid is going to reach poor 
people in poor nations (Lensink & White, 1999).  Efforts to clean up aid have already come in 
the form of adjustment programs and loans with conditionality factors because of countries’ huge 
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debts even after getting aid by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Alba, 2004).  There is 
need for more research on the positive impact of foreign aid on social welfare development in 
developing countries.  Many symptomatic aspects have been examined such as increases or 
decreases in employment, education, and economic markets but have failed to look at other areas 
of social welfare development impact.  To efficiently conduct an analysis to gather pertinent 
information researchers Perez (2003) and Adelman (2003) suggest that more information is 
needed on:  
1) Migration and labor movements, including legal inflows by country of origins; 
2) Data on the impact of rich nation’s domestic producer subsidies on trade; 
3) Data on the tax treatment of developing assets held in rich nations and on the 
income earned by those assets; 
4) Details on tax-information agreements(if any) between developing countries 
and rich countries; 
5) Internationally comparable data on private aid flows from rich countries to 
poor ones, including aid from churches, foundations, and other voluntary 
organizations; Data on remittances from migrants back to their home countries; 
6) Data assessing how rich countries affect the security environment of poor 
countries, from U.S. contributions to keeping major sea-lanes open for trade to 
French and British subsidies for arms sales to developing countries (p. 62). 
 
In addition, studies have not confirmed a correlation between aid and faster growth.  There is 
need for more instruments to effectively measure aid and its effectiveness (Hansen & Tarp, 
1999).   Developing countries continue to find it hard to raise their own capital due to huge debts 
and inability to attract investments.  Structural adjustment or stabilization programs to achieve 
external and internal balance2 have added to these measures and cannot be part of the solution to 
                                                 
2 Internal balance: the aggregate expenditure of the economy is matched by output as stable prices. 
External balance: the current account is met by a sustainable capital net inflow.  (Alba, 2004) 
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making aid work as they undermine ownership (Santiso, 2001; Thomas, 1999).  With these new 
databases of information researchers, policymakers and donors will have greater tools for 
effective decision making and clear the doctored image that permeates the literature.   
It is the inadequacies in management, monitoring, and evaluation of aid impact that 
continue to exacerbate its shortcomings (Santiso, 2001). Ultimately to assess performance 
effectively, there must be efforts and resources dispersed to conduct pre-program behavior and 
conditions and post-program behavior and contributions to legitimately attribute change to the 
intervention (Gilbert & Terrell, 2002).  This assessment framework ensures that global public 
goods and aid goes to work for the issues they were meant to work (Guillaumont, 2004; 
Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001).  There needs to be a greater promotion of the development of all 
rather than a few at the expense of the majority (Edwards & Sen, 2000). The Millennium 
Development Goals have been herald as a way to measure, quantitatively, the progress of 
poverty by 2015 in developing countries.  The MDGs serve as an agreed upon platform for 
monitoring human development progress (Vandemoortele & Roy, 2004).  In fact, efforts 
underway throughout developing countries, under the guise of the MDGs, say a lot for the future 
of aid and its impact on social welfare.  .   
CONCLUSION 
Overall, aid impacts the social welfare development in developing countries but the 
impact is not clear due to a number of factors in evaluating its effectiveness.  Evidence from the 
literature shows that if aid monies are pumped into the infrastructure of education, agriculture, 
healthcare, roads, dams for electricity, policy changes in public service delivery and public 
spending (Dollar & Pritchett, 1998) there will be obvious improvement in social welfare.  There 
has already been increased access to education, clean water, electricity, trained personnel, 
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technical cooperation, and other social welfare impacts evidently increasing social welfare 
development (Hilderbrand, 2002).  There is inevitably a need for more research, cross country 
analyses and models for understanding, measuring and explaining aid and its impact.  The 
responsibility is not only on donors and recipients but on NGOs, civil societies and the people 
themselves (Mallaby, 2004).  Nevertheless, impact is long term and any study that seeks to 
measure impacts otherwise is flawed and hence their results will be flawed (Feeny & 
McGillivray, 2004).  The economic capacity of people will continue to grow as they work 
together on common projects for the benefit of all.  It will come to fruition as they develop self-
sufficiency, using primarily their own resources, guided by their own ideas, engaging in their 
own development (Brueggemann, 2002 & Weiss, 1999).   
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 1 
EXPLANATION OF THE MODEL 
The mirror is a reflective tool that helps us see whatever we desire to see of ourselves. The model 
from this perspective explains simplistically ‘what we want to see of ourselves’.  When we look 
into a mirror, what is it that we are looking to see?  The answer, at the core is ‘to see an image of 
ourselves’.   
The model is explanatory and contains two triangles on a circular platform connected by 
dots of collaboration and spirals to showcase class flow of resources.  The two triangular images 
allow a visual look of hierarchies at work within systems on a circular platform of world economic 
markets.  There are only two triangles because there are with all respects only two world states 
today.  Most countries since the fall of the second world have become third world states. The 
triangles also explain how aid trickles down to the poor, if at all in both world states.   
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Table/s,  
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Country Aid Trade Investment Migration Peacekeeping Environment Final 
Average 
1 NETHERLANDS 6.9 7.0 6.1 4.5 3.5 5.7 5.6 
2 DENMARK 9.0 6.8 1.0 4.4 7.1 5.0 5.5 
3 PORTUGAL 2.2 6.8 9.0 1.0 6.0 5.1 5.2 
4  ZEALAND 1.7 7.2 2.3 9.0 6.9 3.4 5.1 
5 SWITZERLAND 3.3 4.0 6.3 9.0 0.1 7.2 5.0 
6 GERMANY 2.1 6.8 1.4 0.1 3.8 6.0 4.7 
6 SPAIN 2.4 6.8 8.2 1.0 2.9 6.0 4.7 
8 SWEDEN 7.0 6.9 1.0 3.0 1.3 6.1 4.5 
9 AUSTRIA 2.8 6.8 2.6 6.5 2.6 5.4 4.4 
10 NORWAY 6.6 1.0 3.5 4.6 7.4 2.8 4.3 
11 UNITED 
KINGDOM 
3.0 6.9 3.4 3.1 3.6 5.0 4.2 
12 BELGIUM 3.5 6.7 1.4 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.0 
13 GREECE 1.5 6.7 0.0 1.0 9.0 4.8 3.9 
14 FRANCE 3.1 6.8 1.7 0.0 5.2 4.8 3.8 
15 ITALY 1.4 7.0 1.5 1.1 5.3 5.3 3.6 
15 IRELAND 2.6 6.6 2.3 4.5 3.7 1.6 3.6 
17 FINLAND 3.0 6.8 1.7 1.3 2.9 5.4 3.5 
18 CANADA 1.7 6.6 2.1 6.1 2.4 1.7 3.4 
19 AUSTRALIA 1.7 7.2 1.6 3.7 2.0 1.8 3.2 
20 UNITED 
STATES 
0.8 7.7 2.0 2.3 1.5 1.0 2.6 
21 JAPAN 1.2 4.6 2.8 1.5 0.5 4.0 2.4 
The Rankings 
The CGD/FP Commitment to Development Index ranks 21 of the worlds richest countries according to how much 
their policy help or hinder the economic and social development of poor nations.  The index examines six policy 
categories: foreign aid, openness to international trade, investment in developing countries, openness to legal 
immigration, contributions to peacekeeping operations, and responsible environmental practices.  In the table, 
green cells indicate a particularly favorable score in a given category and red cells indicate poor performance. 
Source: Foreign Policy, Ranking the Rich May/June 2003.  Manuel Perez, 2003, p.63. 
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Table 2 
 
STAGES 
 
DONOR 
 
RECIPIENT 
 
LEVEL OF 
NEGOTIATION 
BARGAINING Relations, policies and 
country assessed 
• Donor disbursement patterns 
evaluated for window of 
opportunity and leniency 
Upper level 
ASSESSMENT 
& RE-
ASSESSMENT 
Acknowledge need for aid • Request is made for aid Upper level 
MUTUAL 
BENEFITS 
ESTABLISHED 
Request examined for 
mutual power-political 
economic status/position 
• Wait (policies and willingness to 
comply evaluated by donor 
country) 
Upper level 
EXCHANGE Request reassessed for fit 
Disbursement and reporting 
procedures shared 
Aid disbursed 
Await report 
wait 
• Bargains are made as to what will 
be done with aid theoretically 
• Disbursement and reporting 
procedures hared (only top level 
officials are at table of discussion 
and know the details of 
agreement) 
• Aid received (allocation options 
explored) 
• Strategize fungibility of aid  
• Prioritize aid 
 
Mid & Upper level 
SITUATIONAL 
RE-ANALYSIS 
& RE-
BARGAINING 
Report received  
Situation re-assessment for 
goal accomplishment and 
continued need 
• Aid used with limited 
methodology to track impact Aid 
progress reported 
Mid level 
DEPENDENCY Continued aid disbursed • Request more aid [dependence] Upper level 
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Figure/s  
 
Figure 1  
 
 
Sources: Development Assistance Committee: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: 
Monitoring and Evaluating (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2002); Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washington: World Bank, 
2001) 
Source: Foreign Policy, Ranking the Rich May/June 2003.  Perez, 2003, p.61. 
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Figure 3 
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G-Genitty - Mirror Model ‘04 
An explanation model of foreign aid and its efforts for collaboration.  It 
is constructivist model with inklings of standpoint theory but grounded in 
structural functionalism and systems theory.  
